Business Law Week 7 Short Answer Home Work Assignment

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Question# 1
Bernard Flinn operated a business known as Harvey Investment Co., Inc./ High Risk Loans. Flinn worked as a loan broker, matching those who came to him with lenders willing to loan them money given their credit history and the amount involved. From 1982 through 1985, Flinn found loans for five people. Indiana requires that persons engaged in the business of brokering loans obtain a license from the state. Flinn was prosecuted for brokering loans without having a license. He raised the defense that he did not know that a license was required and that, accordingly, he lacked the criminal intent to broker loans without having a license. Does Flinn have a good defense? [Flinn v. Indiana, 563 N.E.2d 536 (Ind.)]
Answer
Facts of the case
Flinn, the owner of Harvey Investment Co. operated a loan brokering firm without a proper license. In between 1982 and 1985, Flinn managed to obtain finder fees from clients seeking loans but he did not connect them to the loans as he promised. He later even failed to answer their calls and the customers contacted the law enforcers for action. He was sued by Indiana for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) where he defended himself that he had no intention of defrauding the people for lack of a license. A law was present requiring loan brokers to have a license for their activities. The trial court ruled he was guilty but he appealed. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision and invalidated Flinn’s defense that he had no knowledge of registration and hence lacked the intent to commit the crime.

It was immaterial whether Flinn had a license or not. The fact remained that he had failed to deliver on his end of the bargain and thus had defrauded the plaintiffs. The court held that “nothing in the statute required knowledge of the existence of a duty to register”. It thus sufficed that Flinn had defrauded his clients whether or not he was registered (Twomey 150).
Question# 2
Baker and others entered a Wal-Mart store shortly after 3:00 A.M. by cutting through the metal door with an acetylene torch. They had moved some of the merchandise in the store to the rear door, but the police arrived before the merchandise could be taken from the store. Baker was prosecuted for larceny. He raised the defense that he was not guilty of larceny because no merchandise had ever left the store. Is there enough intent and action for a crime? [Tennessee v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. App.)]
Answer
Facts of the case
The defendants (Baker included) broke into the premises of Wal-Mart after closing its hours. After they gained entry, forcefully, and they were in the process of moving goods out of the premise trough to the rear door, the police came and arrested them before they actually took any goods out of the store. Baker alluded that they had taken no property out of the premise and they could thus not be charged for larceny. Their charge in the Tennessee’s prosecution had included the grand larceny which involved any goods worth over $200 that were obtained through taken, trespass or asportation. The defendants are guilty as there is no doubt that they had trespassed into the premises. The subject of contention was whether the goods handled fall under asportation or not. Indeed it was asportation as there was a clear intention of removing the goods from the store (Twomey 154). The question that should guide the decision maker is the motive behind illegally gaining access into private property and moving goods from their placement centers to a place within the premise but provides ease of access to removal of goods. The act of moving goods to the rear door is sufficient reason for larceny charges. The intent and the action were sufficient intent to unlawfully acquiring personal property.
Question #3
Howell made long-distance telephone calls through the telephone company’s computer- controlled switching system to solicit funding for a nonexistent business enterprise. What crimes did Howell commit? [New Mexico v. Howell, 895 F.2d 232 (N.M. App.)]
Answer
Facts of the case
Rowell made several calls to New Mexica homes asserting to be an attorney for those agitating for the recovery of damages suffered in telemarketing and solicited funds payable to an account in Florida. He claimed that the damage fees would be released once the fees were received. He used a computer controlled telephone to make calls to the premises on impersonation to collect money from the unsuspecting public. The residents later reported the matter to the police and he arrested and charged. His crime was the use of a computer impersonate/ pretence, make false claims with the intention to commit fraud (Twomey 156). The Sarbanes-Oxley act clearly outlines what constitutes mail and fraud and his actions place him under the fraud explained therein. He argued that the telephone’s use was inconsistent with New Mexico’s Act for committing fraud but expert testimony proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the phone used to make calls constituted a system crime under the New Mexico Act. He was thus guilty as charged.
Work Cited
Twomey, David P., Marianne Jennings, and Ronald A. Anderson. “Chapter 8.”Anderson’s Business Law and the Legal Environment. Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2014.141-169. Print