Descartes/Hume

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Descartes/Hume
Both Descartes and Hume have interesting theories about how humans acquire knowledge. Descartes is of the opinion that we cannot rely on sense impressions or sense experience to get knowledge, but we only know that which we can ration (Lacewing 1). Hume, on the other hand, believes that we can only gain knowledge by relying on our sense impressions. By clearly examining the two views, I agree with Hume more. Hume’s view is provable, and his assertions make sense for every individual, unlike Descartes’ view, which has many weaknesses.
Hume suggests that we gain knowledge from experience perceived through our common sense (Noonan 60). This assertion is correct because one can only be sure about a thing he or she has had an experience with. Even a child learns from experience. For example, a young child may play with a knife, but he or she would fear to play with it after it cuts him or her. From going through this experience, a child gets to know that playing with a knife is dangerous. From this example, it is clear why some people know more things than others do. It all comes down to the experiences someone has had in the past. If one perceives an experience through his or her senses, he or she gains knowledge. Descartes, on the other hand, seems to suggest that all people’s ideas and thoughts are equal as long as they are built on reasoning. However, everyone can see that this idea is wrong. Someone can only know that which he or she has experienced via his or her senses.

For example, it is easy for a surgeon to perform a surgery, but someone who lacks that knowledge cannot do it.
Concisely, both philosophers aired their views on how they thought human beings know things. Nevertheless, in my opinion, Hume’s opinion is right because people can only know for sure about the existence of what they have perceived through their senses.

Works Cited
Lacewing, Michael. “Descartes’ rationalism.” (2009): 4.
Noonan, Harold. Routledge philosophy guidebook to Hume on knowledge. Routledge, 2002.