Internal Courts And Religious Tolerance

Internal Courts and Religious Tolerance

Introduction

It would have to assess, if the internal courts would have correctly developed the work of verifying and protecting the protection set forth in article 9, with reference to article 13 of the agreement. All this based, that throughout its jurisprudence, it has made it clear that states need a necessary margin to be able to adapt to each of their systems and their social particularities, since they are not equal in all democratic societies.

On the other hand, we also have the right of the company to adopt its own corporate image, the right of this, to stay in a world free of ideologies or beliefs that can dilute or confuse its image, and that could be endowed with full legitimacy,Although in this case, it was not the case.

Developing

The court resolution was to consider it disproportionate, despite the resolutions of the National Courts, by estimating, that they had not reached a fair balance between the right of Mrs. Eweida and the company, for two reasons: the first, because the cross was discreet, and the second, because there was no evidence that authorization to take religious garments to other workers, would have meant a impairment in the image of the company.

It is here, where it has a special relevance, in article 9.2 of the Agreement, when established reference to the limits that the State can carry out a corporal with respect to the demonstration of the law, carrying out an exhaustive work of appreciation regarding the valuations of the National Courts.

Maintain as fundamental axis the principle of appreciation by each State and the proportional application of the same, that if, as it establishes “under the duty of the state of neutrality and impartiality”, when guaranteeing the expression, not only ofThis right to religious freedom, but together with the rest of the fundamental rights.

In this sense, the High Court understands that the national authorities were not up to it (95) “The national authorities did not sufficiently protect the right of the first claimant to express their religion, violating the positive obligation in accordance with the article9 ”, condemning, therefore, the State.

In contradiction with the ruling, I estimate that the fair balance was widely demonstrated by the national courts with arguments such as this of the Labor Court ‘the visible use of a cross is not a mandatory requirement of the Christian faith, but a personal election’, or that of theCourt of Appeal by classifying the British Airways Standard, as legitimate and proportional to its company policy, or when referring to that, “for seven years nobody, including Mrs. Eweida had complained about the norm ”, taking into account, that once the issue is raised, the company addresses it immediately to offer a solution.

More abundantly, when the Court values at its point 80, "religious freedom is a matter of conscience and individual thought", united, to the non -obligation to bring the cross within the Christian faith and the behavior of the company, I understandthat it was not possible to value, or appreciate the good faith and the actions provided by the company, nor the degree of opportunism of the applicant, that the Court of Appeal if he saw. 

Moreover, this degree of commitment of the company for modifying the uniform code is distorted in the judgment itself that the company was able to modify the code demonstrates that the previous prohibition was not of crucial importance. This discrepancy is reflected in the ruling of the sentence, which has five votes in favor and two against, the latter supporting the decision of the National Courts by estimating that they had acted in a proportionate way, and had considered the legitimacy of the legitimacy of thecompany for the purpose they proposed.

Anyway, Mrs. Eweida, was not compensated in all its claims, despite recognizing the violation of article 9, the amount for moral damage that it requested was significantly reduced to the amount of € 2000, it is clear that frustration, anguish and anxiety, they weren’t as traumatic as she claimed. However, the court considered to grant the amount of 30.000 € for costs.

In the second case, that of the nurse who wanted to carry a cross around his neck as an expression of his faith, the court had much clearer, since this case is not a conflict of private interests between the worker and his rightTo express their faith, and the businessman, in his right of organization and business management, but goes beyond, when the rights of third parties and the general interest into play comes into play.

Likewise, he is recognized by the right that protected her collected in the art. 9, but in this case, the Court does not value the responsibility "because of the state"a plural and democratic society.

conclusion

Here we see in a very clear way as the Court will review the margin of appreciation granted by the law, when we talk about the protection of order and public health, since some forms of manifestation of religion can constitute areal danger to these. The behavior of the Mrs. Chaplin, it was from any unjustified point of view, since the exhibition of their cross before, to the right that patients have to receive assistance with the maximum guarantees, moreover, even allowing it to take it more safely, its obcecation continued. 

 It is clear that the actions of the courts focused on the weighting between rights exercises, especially because the rights of third parties came into play, when the protection of health was demanded, which entails the following right to patients’ life. In this case, the Court, with a complete success, within the power it has to control the exercise of the limits that the State can apply by virtue of the law, he understood, that he had to provide him with a wide margin of appreciation.

 When it is to protect health and safety, being in a more favorable position to weigh it than it, as revealed in the purpose section. It follows that the court is unable to dictate that the measures denounced by Mrs. Chaplin were disproportionate. It follows that interference with his freedom to express his religion was necessary in a democratic society