Plato’s Theory of Forms and Aristotle’s Theory of Happiness in the NE we are left with contradiction nonetheless, and Why is that?

Name:
Instructor:
Course:
Date:
Aristotle and Plato
This paper will investigate into the works of Plato and Aristotle to further understand when we try to come to an inherent truth on the highest good that these two men speak of that we are left with a contradiction. In what starts out as the pursuit of the truth of what human beings seek to obtain as the highest good, is soon seen to be a cyclical paradox that unknowingly wages war in our minds on a day to day basis. However, perhaps in search of such a good we are left not to be stuck at a dead end but in truth to always be becoming as human beings a living contradiction.
In both Plato and Aristotle, respectively, they arrive at an opposite end in their arguments for what is and how to reach this highest good that each of them speaks of. In doing so, they leave the reader to ponder on the readings that they have read already in earlier chapters of the texts. For Plato, *the Five Dialogues and for Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. However, it’s no mistake that the books (chapters) in which these brilliant thinkers will inevitably reveal to us to showing a contradiction are the last of the books in the sections we spoke of in class. To only be stated as a banal platitude, it is the journey that makes us who we are and not the goal. While such an overused statement almost seems to have no meaning behind it without context, this time around the capacity of such a saying will bring to light an even greater maxim in the arguments for these two men.

Before beginning the cliché journey that was spoken of, let us define contradiction so that as Aristotle would say “if like archers, we have a target it to aim at, we are more likely to hit the right mark (NE, pg 196).” Let a contradiction be defined as a proposition in which asserts and denies the very same thing, where the property of false, is possible in all conditions. To establish the contradictory arguments for each philosopher let us lay the concrete foundation for each theory before speaking of the technicalities of contradiction. While each of them has a different highest good, not to say that they don’t cross paths but are different in what approach they take to teaching them we must not compare them as such. But talk about their established principles on which they are built before explaining the contradictory behavior of these two men in their works.
We begin with Plato and the Theory of Forms, he argues, that the world exists as a dualistic format of the visible realm and the intellectual realm. In the visible realm, he exclaims that it is rife with the illusion, a world in which can be only understood by our senses this is also known as the world of becoming. It is in this world of becoming that Plato argues, that sensually we will always be deceived because we are in a state of constant flux due to our physical existence in this world. However, this is but one-half of Plato’s dualistic theory when he gives an account of the intelligible world which is known as the realm of being. It is in the world that things exist just as they are if they exist as if they are not then to be put simply they do not exist. This is the world that is susceptible to thought, and it is here that we see the purest essences of things that exist in the visible world. The reason to which these principles exist in the visible world is that we know for example the Beauty in itself in the intelligible is the cause or form of what exists in the visible world.
Plato gives an allegory to make a note of the schematics to this theory of forms and the dualistic approach in Book VI of the Republic where Glaucon asks Socrates about the nature of “The Good” and in turn he gives the explanation of the Cave, to be explained later. However, after explaining the allegory to Glaucon, Socrates talks about the dividing line in which doesn’t necessarily speak of what The Good is but gives an account on how to reach it. To give a brief account on the cave Plato’s Socrates tells Glaucon to imagine men shackled up to stone in a cave, their extremities are chained as well as their head always facing a wall in which shadows are portrayed in the passing of gentlemen on an elevated path that stresses behind them. They hold up puppets in front of fire as they pass by making sounds. As a result, this the images of the objects they are holding are cast on the wall in front for the men that are shackled. They see only the shadows on the wall, and they assume them to be the only truth to which they know. At some point, like some kind of social experiment, one of the men are realized from the shackles and turns around to be dazzled by the light for which they don’t know what it is but once his eyes are adjusted he takes note of the path in front of him and the cause of the puppets shadows on the wall. Not going into excessive detail but he then notices a path leading out of the can and in the translation given he is “forcefully dragged up the pathway.” Once he gets to the entrance of the cave, he is then blinded by the sun. Much like the little maxim the man understood about the fire he saw casting shadows or the illusions he saw on the wall that he had known all his life, his eyes yet again Become adjusted to the sun’s light, and he sees the objects around him for that which they are.
There is more to the allegory, but this brief interpretation of explaining Plato’s theory and leading up to his contradiction in the next paragraph will suffice. After explaining to Glaucon the allegory of the cave to bring to light the question of “what is the good?” by Glaucon, he only tells the analogy to give insight to speak about “the child of the good, begotten in the likeness of the good” (P, Republic VI, Ln 508b-c). in It is in this that Plato reveals to us that in the world of Becoming the sun is what gives the senses its intended results for seeing illusions and “The Good” in the realm of that which is, the world of Being as a cause for all rational objects of thought. This, as a result, shows us in Plato’s Theory of Forms that at the top of the dividing line in the realm of Being is “The Good itself.”
However in the pursuit to reach the top of Plato’s Theory of the Forms we arrive at “The Good itself” however Plato’s Socrates has this to say about “The Good,” “Still goodness is not itself being. It transcends being, exceeding all else in dignity and power” (P, Republic VI, Ln 509b-c). It is here that almost the whole theory of forms for the reader would seem to go “out the window” as Plato laid out a foundation for which his dualistic realms thrived, he goes on as if to say that the “Highest Good” that we strive to achieve as human beings working up the divided line and by analogy out of the cave is nothing. But is it? Because Plato says that the existence of “The Good” transcends the very Being of the intelligible world suggesting that we are back in a world of contradiction. For the Sun as mentioned above is to vision as the Good is to knowledge, as explained when the once chained up man stumbles out of the cave. Stumble I promise you is not an accidental term for the contradiction argument, and it may seem quite paradoxical that the “Highest Good” for Plato is that this struggle of constantly coming out of the cave to “see the sun” as it equates to knowledge is not something that just happens once in a lifetime. For Plato in contradiction of “The Good” being the “Highest Good” itself, we as human beings are always stumbling along the path of reason between that what is and is not in the search for this knowledge; a constant battle of ignorance and knowledge.
Again, like Plato, we must put down the stepping stones of Aristotle’s Theory of Happiness before we can tackle the issue of contradiction. Every man has an unalienable for the pursuit of happiness, which in all aspects, is attainable. Aristotle indicates that in a way, happiness is indicative of the quality of the entire human life in totality, although we may not have good times or fun all the time. Aristotle attempts to discover the supreme good for any man in the Nicomachean Ethics, on what is the most appropriate to live our life with attached meaning to it, and he says that such is best comprehended by the purpose, goal, or end. The ultimate goal for our supreme good is happiness, saying “And of this nature happiness is mostly thought to be, for this, we always choose for its sake, and never with a view to anything further.” This happiness requires us to live a life that would enable us to utilize and develop our intellect, in conformity with reason; it is an activity, enduring and profound, rather than a state such as pleasure or amusement that even animals can enjoy. Although this happiness can be affected by real situations such as material wealth, Aristotle maintains that as long as we fully live as rational beings in agreement with our essential nature, we would still become happy. Happiness is thus more on the cultivation of individualistic virtue (habit and behavior) in our day-to-day lives in which we develop the ability to cope with any misfortune in perspective and with adequate balance. A genuine happy life requires that various conditions, among them the mental and physical wellbeing, and virtue is attained by a balance between these two excesses.
Aristotle further states that young people “cannot be happy,” saying “A boy is not happy owing to his age; boys who are called happy are being congratulated because of the hopes we have for them.” Happiness requires a complete life to be fully lived, which a child naturally does not possess. He retells Herodotus story about Solon and Croesus and insists that life must be finished wholly before a conclusion is made on whether one has experienced a happy one. He quips, “But must one be called while he still lives?” Friendship is crucial to the attainment of happiness, and the best is that which is founded on virtue where one wishes their friends the best in whatever they do without the need for pleasure or utility. Aristotle refers it as the “complete sort of friendship between people who are good and alike in virtue” (NE, II pg56).
A critical review of the Nicomachean Ethics shows an apparent change in the views upheld by Aristotle, from where he sets to discover the chief book in book I. The work that follows, however, makes us wonder whether this good, Aristotle’s ethics upshot, is where the aim of all things is (I.1); that which everything aims at if possible or happiness in (I.7); the soul’s activity according to virtue or reason (I.7); or through contemplation (X.7). We wonder then how we can achieve well in a simultaneous manner with all these different facets, where in book 1, he recommends all activity to be according to virtue for happiness and whether virtue alone in book X counts for joy. Aristotle accepts the “unity of virtues” that no single person can possess a single virtue without possessing all of them. This is because he believes that while the virtues do not manifest a single thing because of their precise independence, if the books are to be good, then they must have some coordination (NE, III pg44). This is achieved through practical wisdom, which, however, cannot be attained if one does not contain the virtues in a certain rudimentary form. Therefore, if a person wholly possesses any one virtue, the implication is that he is in possession of all virtues.
When Aristotle divides intellect into two different parts of theoretical knowledge and practical wisdom (deliberation); at first in the book he says true happiness is this deliberation while in book ten says that it is secondary to true happiness that being theoretical knowledge. This is obviously a contradiction. Moreover, Aristotle holds that an individual may possess a virtue without possessing all the others, holding that there is no unity among the virtues. Notably, he says the attributes dealing with magnificence and generosity and expenditures, and Aristotle says that an individual can exhibit kindness without magnificence. Additionally, generosity and magnificence are distinctly unique, because the latter is a distinct capacity and skill for dealing accordingly with massive expenditures. Because immense wealth is a prerequisite in undertaking huge costs, and because virtues are acquired out of our actions demonstrating the virtue, it, therefore means that it is only the wealthy that have the ability to develop and practice magnificence. Additionally, it is impractical and unrealistic for the suggestion that only immense wealth is a requisite for practical wisdom which unifies all the virtues. Thus, Aristotle generally agrees to the “unity of virtues” but singles out two virtues in which this does not apply. This purported independence cannot be greater than that between any other two virtues.
In conclusion, this paper has discussed the works of Plato and Aristotle in an attempt to comprehend essential truths on the highest good, albeit leaving us with contradictions from these two philosophers. Plato discusses his “Theory of Forms” in his writings, the Five Dialogues, where he argues that will always be deceived because our physical being in the world exposes us to constant deception. In pursuing the top, we find ourselves on “the good itself” in which we strive to achieve as a man. The contradiction arises where Plato believes that this “highest good” is a constant struggle out of the cave to view the sun, equating knowledge to something that happens through our lifetime. “The Good” being the “Highest Good” in itself makes us stumble in our search for knowledge regularly. Aristotle, in this “Theory of Happiness” published in the “Nicomachean Ethics” argues that the supreme good for any man lies in attaining happiness, in conformity with our rationality and reason. In the first book, Aristotle says that true happiness is practical wisdom while in book ten he says it is secondary to true happiness (theoretical knowledge). Virtue is central to achieving this happiness, but the contradiction in his theory is where while he advocates for the unity of all virtues. He nevertheless still believes that certain virtues are all distinctly unity and cannot act ultra vires.